Excerpt:
A flurry of high-level calls between Egypt, Turkey, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia is reviving an old conversation with new urgency: can four pivotal states in the Arab-Islamic world assemble something NATO-like—a durable security architecture with shared planning, procurement, and political leverage—without importing the downsides of bloc politics? This piece maps the real building blocks already on the table, the gaps that still yawn, and why Dearborn’s civic voice keeps pushing for diplomacy, human rights, and a just peace for Palestine as the measure of any regional project’s worth.
“Where Western designs once set the blueprint, today the region must write its own.” — Zayd Al-Fadil, calling for a strategic regional alliance led by Saudi Arabia that includes Pakistan, Turkey, and Egypt, to restrain extremism and end impunity for war crimes. [1]
The phone calls that rebooted an idea
On September 13, 2025, Egypt’s Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty held intensive phone calls with his counterparts in Saudi Arabia (Prince Faisal bin Farhan), Turkey (Hakan Fidan), and Pakistan (Ishaq Dar), framing “rapid regional developments” and “joint coordination” ahead of a key summit. The Egyptian government publicized the outreach across its official platforms and state media, underscoring the Cairo-Riyadh-Ankara-Islamabad axis as a practical channel—not merely a talking point. [2][3][4][5] This communication wave didn’t come out of nowhere; it rides several years of normalization, defense industrial deals, and joint statements that—if stitched together—start to look like the bones of a security framework.
What makes this moment different? Three shifts:
Normalization and structured dialogue between Egypt and Turkey after a decade of frosty ties. Presidents Erdoğan and Sisi revived their High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council in 2024, signing joint declarations and launching a cascade of ministerial agreements—energy, transport, education, and defense among them. [6][7][8][9][10][11]
Defense-industrial interlock between Turkey and Saudi Arabia, headlined by Baykar’s record export of AKINCI unmanned combat aircraft to Riyadh—paired with plans for local production lines and broader defense cooperation. [12][13][14]
An increasingly formalized Turkey-Pakistan partnership, from the joint MILGEM corvette program to fresh security, defense-industry, and central-bank MoUs signed in early 2025 and reinforced by high-level visits in mid-2025. [15][16][17][18][19]
Set these relations beside Saudi-Pakistan military coordination (naval focus included) and the long-standing Egypt-Saudi strategic council, and we get a clearer picture: no formal “NATO of the Middle East,” but a dense mesh of councils, committees, MoUs, exercises, and procurement pipelines that could be braided into something more durable. [20][21][22][23]
The living blueprints already on the table
1) IMCTC: A ready-made, if limited, umbrella.
Saudi Arabia launched the Islamic Military Counter-Terrorism Coalition (IMCTC) in 2015. Headquartered in Riyadh and led militarily by former Pakistani Army Chief Gen. Raheel Sharif, it has grown to 43 members. IMCTC isn’t a mutual-defense pact, but it is a coalition with a joint center and shared doctrine against terrorism—meaning Egypt, Turkey, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia already share a minimal operational vocabulary. [24][25]
2) Defense industry as connective tissue.
Turkish defense tech—especially drones—has become a hub for Gulf and South Asian partnerships. The Saudi–Baykar AKINCI deal is not only about buying platforms; it’s about co-production and capability transfer in the Kingdom, a sign of more symmetrical relations rather than vendor-client dependency. Reports also flag Saudi financing in future Turkish-linked drone production for Africa. [12][13][14][28]
On the maritime side, Türkiye–Pakistan’s MILGEM project builds interoperable naval platforms and common training pipelines—another brick in a shared security architecture. [15][26][27]
3) Normalization as security architecture.
Egypt and Türkiye didn’t simply “make up.” They signed joint declarations to reactivate a top-tier council and then followed up with clustered MoUs from energy to defense—creating a bureaucratic track that can host joint planning, crisis coordination, and procurement decisions. [6][7][8][9][10][11] On the diplomatic side, Ankara also re-engaged the Arab League ministerial in Cairo in 2024 for the first time in 13 years, aligning tone and tempo with Arab capitals during the Gaza crisis. [29]
4) Saudi–Pakistan security coordination—especially at sea.
In 2025, senior Pakistani and Saudi officers highlighted deeper cooperation on maritime security and joint training—practical steps as the Red Sea and Arabian Sea remain crowded by conflict spillovers and gray-zone threats. [20][21]
Put together, these are not a treaty with Article-5-style guarantees. They’re more like steel rebar under wet concrete—alignment in practice that could be poured into a larger frame.
What a four-nation “NATO-like” structure would require
A. Scope clarity. NATO is a collective defense alliance for a specific geography; these four capitals would be designing something closer to a collective security and stability compact, initially focused on:
Joint situational awareness (maritime domain awareness in the Red Sea/Arabian Sea/Eastern Med; airspace coordination around flashpoints).
Standardized procurement & maintenance (shared training syllabi, interoperable platforms, and shared depots).
Crisis-response units (humanitarian air/sea corridors, disaster response, evacuation planning).
Political coordination on Israel/Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, Sudan—especially ceasefire diplomacy and international-law tracks.
These functions already show up in fragments—Egypt–Türkiye council work, Saudi–Türkiye defense production, Saudi–Pakistan naval cooperation, and IMCTC doctrine. Formalizing them would move from ad-hoc to standing mechanisms. [6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13][14][20][21][24][25]
B. Decision rules.
A minimalist charter could start with consensus for hard power, qualified majority for logistics and procurement—keeping politics from paralyzing maintenance, training, and humanitarian aid.
C. Parliamentary and public safeguards.
The Green Party instinct in Dearborn is to insert democratic guardrails: civilian oversight, transparency on arms use, compliance with humanitarian law, and unambiguous commitments to protect civilians in conflict. Without these, any “alliance” risks becoming just another hard-edged club.
“The region no longer accepts being planned for by outsiders, as if it were empty of its own people.” — Zayd Al-Fadil [1]
Gaza, Rafah, and the test that matters
The deepest moral and strategic question is Palestine. When Erdoğan visited Cairo in February 2024, both presidents focused on stopping an Israeli assault on Rafah and reviving a path to a Palestinian state. [30] Days later and throughout 2024, Türkiye widened its coordination with Arab partners—including a rare seat at the Arab League ministerial for the first time in 13 years—to push collective responses to Israeli escalation. [29][31]
A Cairo–Ankara–Riyadh–Islamabad security compact has meaning only if it safeguards people—particularly Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank—rather than just hardening borders. The alliance Zayd Al-Fadil sketches is explicit on this point: align to deter massacres, end impunity, and press for a just settlement. [1]
Constraints that could stall the project
Divergent theaters, divergent priorities.
Pakistan’s strategic bandwidth is split by crises with India; Egypt’s is pinned by the Sinai-Gaza-Red Sea arc; Saudi Arabia’s by Gulf security and its Vision 2030 defense-industrial buildout; Türkiye’s by the Eastern Med, Syria, the Caucasus, and NATO obligations. These aren’t small differences—they shape budgets, training, and doctrine.
Legacy frictions.
Ankara and Cairo’s Libya differences haven’t vanished; trust is growing, not guaranteed. Riyadh’s calculus on Iran (de-escalation since 2023) is not identical to Ankara’s or Cairo’s; Pakistan balances Gulf ties with China’s corridor diplomacy and its own economic crunch. These factors complicate a tight Article-5-style pledge.
Institutional plumbing is slow.
NATO’s secret sauce is not just weapons—it’s databases, joint standards, common spares, and predictable funding lines. That takes tedious, good governance. The good news: the councils, MoUs, and joint ventures cited above are exactly that kind of plumbing. [6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13][14][18][24][25]
If it happens, what could it look like—practically?
1) A standing “Four-Capitals Council.”
Meets quarterly, rotates chairs, publishes a short communique with concrete deliverables: training cycles, procurement milestones, and humanitarian protections.
2) A joint maritime picture & rescue network.
Red Sea, Arabian Sea, and Eastern Mediterranean focal points linking naval ops rooms in Alexandria, Jeddah, Karachi, and Aksaz. Leverages existing Saudi–Pakistan naval coordination and MILGEM integration. [20][21][15][26][27]
3) A defense-industry compatibility map.
Three-year plan for shared maintenance hubs and spares pools. Use the Saudi–Baykar AKINCI model (local production + training) as template for other systems; loop Egypt into UAV and EW support chains as relations with Ankara deepen. [12][13][14][6][7][8][9][10][11]
4) A humanitarian and legal task force.
To track ceasefire compliance, civilian protection, and the delivery of aid—especially to Palestinians—aligning with international law and the ICJ’s genocide-prevention obligations. (Politically, this is the part that gives such a format legitimacy in Dearborn and beyond.)
Why the idea keeps resurfacing
From the Trump-era talk of an “Arab NATO” to the current IMCTC umbrella, the region has cycled through alliance proposals. What’s novel today is the density of practical ties: Egypt–Türkiye’s structured council; Türkiye–Saudi co-production; Türkiye–Pakistan naval and industrial programs; Saudi–Pakistan maritime coordination. These are tangible; they can be scaled. [6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13][14][15][26][27][20][21]
And as Reuters noted in 2024, Ankara has been overtly calling for stronger Islamic-world coordination to counter Israeli expansionism—a politics that has nudged it closer to Arab capitals on Palestine even as it manages disagreements elsewhere. [31]
“This is the ‘new Middle East’—not of fragmentation, but of capable states setting the terms of peace.” — Paraphrasing Zayd Al-Fadil’s 2025 argument for a Saudi-anchored strategic coalition with Egypt, Turkey, and Pakistan. [1]
The Dearborn angle: what we will support, loudly
Dearborn families trace roots to every corner of this story. Our community cares less about flags on a podium and more about whether children in Gaza eat, whether refugees can return home in dignity, whether journalists can work without being targeted, whether the Red Sea is safe for civilian shipping, and whether climate resilience outruns the next war.
From a Green Party lens, the bench-marks for any alliance are simple and non-negotiable:
Human rights over hardware. Procurement must come with enforceable protections for civilians and transparency in use.
Ceasefire and accountability in Palestine. The alliance’s moral credibility rides on whether it can stop the machinery of mass harm, not just re-balance it.
Climate security as security. Shared disaster response, water management, and clean-energy transition belong at the core, not the periphery.
Regional dignity without bloc belligerence. Cooperation should repel occupation and apartheid while avoiding new cold-war traps.
If Cairo, Ankara, Riyadh, and Islamabad can make that the spine of their framework—call it a compact, a council, or a coalition—Dearborn’s readers will judge it not by its acronym, but by the lives it saves and the peace it enables.
Sources
زيد الفضيل، “السعودية وتحالف القبضة الاستراتيجي الإقليمي” (13 تموز/يوليو 2025). (Arabic)
موقع نبض
Egyptian State Information Service (SIS): “FM reviews regional developments with Saudi, Pakistani, Turkish counterparts” (Sept. 13, 2025).
SIS Egypt
MFA Egypt (Facebook post): “اتصالات مكثفة لوزير الخارجية…” (Sept. 13, 2025). (Arabic)
Facebook
Egyptian Cabinet (Facebook repost of MFA statement). (Arabic)
Facebook
El-Balad: “اتصالات مكثفة لوزير الخارجية…” (Sept. 13, 2025). (Arabic)
صدى البلد
SIS: “Egypt, Turkey sign joint declaration to restructure Strategic Cooperation Council” (Feb. 14, 2024).
SIS Egypt
Türkiye’s Directorate of Communications: “High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council Joint Declaration” (Sept. 4, 2024). (Turkish/English summary)
iletisim.gov.tr
France 24: “Turkey and Egypt turn ‘new leaf’ as Erdoğan visits Cairo” (Feb. 14, 2024).
France 24
AP News: “Egypt’s president makes his first visit to Turkey…” (Sept. 4, 2024).
AP News
Al Jazeera: “Egypt’s el-Sisi says Turkey visit paves way for ‘new phase’” (Sept. 4, 2024).
Al Jazeera
Türkiye MFA: “Joint statement between the Foreign Ministers of Türkiye and Egypt” (Feb. 4, 2025).
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Baykar official release: “Baykar signs major export deal with Saudi Arabia” (July 18, 2023).
Baykar Tech
Breaking Defense: “Turkey, Saudi Arabia ink deal for Baykar AKINCI drones” (July 19, 2023).
Breaking Defense
SavunmaTR (Turkish defense industry outlet): “Türkiye ile Suudi Arabistan arasında kapsamlı savunma iş birliği” (2023). (Turkish)
SavunmaTR
Naval News: “Türkiye delivers corvette to Pakistan” (Sept. 23, 2023).
Naval News
Naval News: “Pakistan’s 3rd MILGEM corvette PNS BADR launched in Karachi” (May 2022).
Naval News
TCMB (Turkish Central Bank): MoU with State Bank of Pakistan on central banking cooperation (Feb. 13, 2025). (Turkish)
TCMB
Türkiye Directorate of Communications: “Türkiye ile Pakistan arasında 24 anlaşma imzalandı” (Feb. 2025). (Turkish)
iletisim.gov.tr
Reuters: “Top Turkish officials to visit Pakistan for defense-industry talks” (July 8, 2025).
Reuters
Arab News Pakistan: “Pakistan, Saudi military officials agree to deepen defense cooperation” (Feb. 2025).
Arab News
Arab News Pakistan: “Pakistan, Saudi Arabia discuss maritime security, defense training” (July 24, 2025).
Arab News
SPA (Saudi Press Agency): “Saudi Arabia and Egypt—Strategic partnership through the Coordination Council” (backgrounder).
Saudi Press Agency
Middle East Institute: “Egypt and Saudi Arabia: any good relationship needs work” (July 2, 2025).
Middle East Institute
Islamic Military Counter-Terrorism Coalition (official site).
IMCTC
IMCTC overview (Wikipedia, updated 2025; background and membership count).
Wikipedia
EDR Magazine: “ASFAT masterpiece: Babur-class Pakistan Navy MILGEM program” (Sept. 23, 2023).
EDR Magazine
MILGEM project overview (Wikipedia, updated 2025).
Wikipedia
Nordic Monitor: “Turkey to sell drones with Saudi financing, production in KSA” (July 24, 2024).
Nordic Monitor
Reuters: “Turkey heads to Arab League ministerial for first time in 13 years” (Sept. 9, 2024).
Reuters
AP News: “Leaders of Turkey and Egypt unite to stop Israel’s Rafah offensive” (Feb. 14, 2024).
AP News
Reuters: “Erdoğan calls for Islamic alliance against Israel” (Sept. 7, 2024).
Reuters
Urdu News (Urdu): “سعودی عرب—ترکی دفاعی فرموں کے ساتھ معاہدے/AKINCI” (Aug. 7, 2023).
Urdu News – اردو نیوز
Dawn (Urdu): “AKINCI drone deal with Saudi Arabia” (July 19, 2023).
dawnnews.tv
TRT (Urdu): “Turkish FM to visit Egypt as ties deepen” (Aug. 8, 2025).
TRT Global
PTV (Urdu): “Turkish Defense Minister honors Pakistan’s armed forces; vows expanded cooperation” (Sept. 2025).
Pakistan Television
Radio Pakistan (Urdu): “PM invites Turkish firms to invest; JMC co-chairs meet in Islamabad” (Sept. 2025).
urdu.radio.gov.pk
Notes on sources and languages
This article references primary statements and reliable reporting in Arabic, Turkish, Urdu, and English. Footnote numbers in the text correspond to the numbered list above.
Dearborn’s bottom line
A Cairo–Ankara–Riyadh–Islamabad framework will be judged by the ordinary people it protects. The Green current in Dearborn supports cooperation that privileges human life, ends collective punishment, advances Palestinian self-determination, and aligns security with climate and economic justice. If this four-nation “spine” can deliver those goods—transparently and lawfully—count us in the cheering section. If not, we’ll keep pressing for a regional architecture that can.
Disclaimer
Dearborn Blog provides analysis and commentary for informational purposes only. We strive for accuracy by citing official statements and reputable outlets; however, facts and policies can change quickly. This article does not constitute legal, military, investment, or diplomatic advice. All opinions expressed herein are the author’s and do not necessarily reflect those of any government, institution, or organization referenced. Readers are encouraged to verify information directly with the cited sources.
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