Excerpt:
A new peer-reviewed study comparing U.S. and Russian public knowledge about the war in Ukraine finds something deeply paradoxical: each public is better at spotting misinformation in the other side’s narrative than in its own. That’s not a bug of modern media—it’s the feature authoritarian propagandists and commercial news incentives both exploit. Here’s what that means for democracy, for Dearborn, and for a Green vision grounded in peace, press freedom, and an informed public.
When you stare into a mirror long enough, you start mistaking the reflection for the room. That’s the unsettling message in a 2025 Political Psychology study by Patrick Beattie and Elena Sherstoboeva. Surveying knowledge accuracy and bias among U.S. and Russian respondents, they find that people tend to be more accurate about the opposition’s narrative than about their own—and yet remain more biased toward their in-group’s story. In plain English: folks in both countries can often debunk the other side’s myths while staying surprisingly credulous about their own media’s framing. That’s a recipe for hardened public opinion and stalled diplomacy. [1]
“U.S. participants… were much more effective at discerning truth from fiction concerning the foreign narrative, but worse at doing the same regarding the dominant narrative in their own country.” [1]
This isn’t moral equivalence between an authoritarian propaganda system and a pluralistic, if messy, media environment. It’s a reminder that information ecosystems can fail in different ways. Russia’s state-aligned media has waged what Peter Pomerantsev calls a “war against reality,” a decades-long experiment in manufacturing confusion. [2] The United States, meanwhile, preserves robust legal protections for speech and press, but often funnels attention into narrow narrative lanes—a function of commercial incentives, polarization, and platform dynamics that reward heat over light. David Kaye’s work on “who governs the internet” underlines how platform rules, regulatory pressures, and private power shape what most people see. [3]
None of this absolves us of responsibility. It calls us to do better.
What the study actually shows
The Beattie–Sherstoboeva paper asked respondents to label claims about the war as true or false, pairing them with confidence ratings. The finding is not that Americans “believe propaganda” and Russians “don’t,” or vice versa. It’s subtler—and more troubling. Each public shows knowledge gaps that track with the dominant narrative in their own media environment. [1]
This aligns with broader comparative research on propaganda and media effects. Content analyses from the first months of the full-scale invasion found tight coupling between elite messaging and mass media coverage in both Russia and the West—obviously tighter and more coercive in Russia, but still notably aligned in U.S. outlets early on. [4] Another large-scale study tracked how leaders’ war messages reverberated across media and public discourse in multiple countries. In short: agenda-setting works. [5]
That matters because agendas steer the questions we ask. If your starting point is “Why is Russia expanding?” you may undervalue security dilemmas centered on NATO expansion. If your premise is “Ukraine is a den of Nazis,” you miss the agency of Ukrainians resisting invasion and the reality of plural politics in Kyiv. NATO’s Jens Stoltenberg later put it bluntly: Putin “went to war to prevent NATO… close to his borders,” but got the opposite—more NATO. [6]
“Right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues than through authoritative selection.” —United States v. Associated Press (1945) [9]
That 1945 line is not quaint constitutional poetry; it’s operational guidance for the information age.
Why people double down on their side
The study’s authors point to a psychological mechanism with a sci-fi-sounding name and very non-fiction consequences: attitude inoculation—exposing people to a weak version of an opposing argument and immediately batting it down. It leaves audiences feeling “vaccinated” against the other side’s case. [1][8] Russian pro-war messaging, interviews suggest, often frames and refutes Western claims rather than inventing facts whole cloth; it trains viewers to treat challenges as pathogens. [7]
U.S. audiences aren’t immune to inoculation either—ours just tends to flow through partisan talk shows, virality engines, and news pegs. Add stress, humiliation, fear, and wartime patriotism—documented across Russian society—and you get even stronger susceptibility to emotional appeals. [7] Historians of the Soviet “culture of victory” have shown how patriotic memory can fuse with loyalty to state narratives, especially in wartime. [10][11]
Now blend the supply side (what the media serves) with the demand side (what audiences want, psychologically and socially). You get a feedback loop: selective exposure, identity protection, and group loyalty reward the narratives that help us belong to our tribe. The mirror fogs; the room feels small.
The policy stakes: diplomacy vs. drumbeat
When publics lack accurate and balanced knowledge, certain policy preferences become less thinkable. If Russians believe Kyiv is dominated by neo-Nazis and ethnic Russians face genocide, escalation starts to look humanitarian. If Americans believe Putin’s motives are purely imperial and not at all shaped by security concerns, even discussing negotiations can feel like appeasement. [1]
A sober reading of the strategic literature insists on a broader map. RAND analysts warned early about the costs of a long war—humanitarian, economic, geopolitical—while not arguing for capitulation. [12] In Foreign Affairs, Liana Fix and Michael Kimmage laid out practical frameworks to sustain Ukraine and manage escalation risks. [13] Fareed Zakaria’s columns and broadcasts underscored a simple point: domestic politics in the U.S. and Europe are as decisive as any battlefield turn. [14][15]
Polling bears this out. Partisan splits on Ukraine hardened through 2024–2025, then showed signs of flux—with Republican opinion oscillating between fatigue and cautious support depending on framing and events. [16][17] That volatility isn’t trivial; it’s the political weather within which life-and-death decisions are made.
Numbers that change the narrative
- 1 peer-reviewed study (2025) finds both U.S. and Russian publics more accurate about the other side’s narrative than their own [1].
- 140.5 million words analyzed across leaders’, media, and mass discourse in a major content study of the war—showing strong agenda-setting effects [5].
- “More NATO” — Stoltenberg’s 2023 summary of Putin’s unintended result, now a staple of allied messaging [6].
What this means for Dearborn
Dearborn sits at the confluence of immigrant memory, industrial pragmatism, and a civic culture that argues with facts. Our neighbors include Ukrainian Americans with family under fire and Arab Americans who recognize the costs of war intimately—especially amid the U.S. role in enabling Israeli military actions in Gaza and Lebanon. A Green politics worthy of our city must be anti-imperialist, anti-occupation, anti-collective punishment, and pro-human dignity, everywhere. That’s not a slogan; it’s a method.
Method means process: debate shaped by verified sources, not vibes. It means platform pluralism: not letting a few for-profit filters define public reality. It means peace-first policy: sanctions and pressure aimed at diplomacy, not forever war—and universal standards that apply whether we’re looking at Ukraine, Gaza, or anywhere civilians are trapped between rockets and rhetoric.
To be pro-Palestine and pro-peace in Dearborn is also to demand media that show the whole picture, resist dehumanization, and elevate real on-ramps to ceasefires and negotiations. The mirror tricks are the same across conflicts: flattening complex histories into team jerseys, training us to spot only the other side’s lies.
“The internet offers no shortage of ideological diversity for those with the skills, time, and inclination to construct their own diverse media diet.” [1]
Skills can be taught. Time can be shared through community curation—libraries, mosques, churches, unions, neighborhood hubs. Inclination grows when leaders model curiosity over certainty.
Five practices to widen the frame
- Triangulate before you tweet. For any big claim about the war, sample three sources: a mainstream outlet in your country, one abroad, and a primary source (speech transcript, official report, or peer-reviewed study). Stoltenberg’s “more NATO” line? Read the full remarks, not just the clip. [6]
- Separate values from evidence. Values are your compass; evidence is your map. If the map changes, don’t keep walking north into a lake. The Political Psychology study gives you one more reason to re-check your bearings. [1]
- Reward nuance. Media diets improve when audiences click, share, and subscribe to reporting that adds context rather than adrenaline. That’s true whether the dateline is Kharkiv or Khan Younis.
- Use the long shelf. Read books and reports, not just threads. Pomerantsev and Kaye are useful starting points for understanding propaganda and platform governance. [2][3] RAND, Foreign Affairs, and rigorous polling can anchor you when the feed turns stormy. [12][13][16][17]
- Bring it home. In Dearborn, host public teach-ins that pair Ukrainian, Palestinian, and Yemeni voices with scholars of international law and media effects. The point isn’t to collapse conflicts into one; it’s to hear how narratives travel, how dehumanization rhymes, and how accountability looks when you refuse to choose between peoples.
What about “bothsidesism”?
Clarity first: Russia launched a war of aggression in 2022, shattering the UN Charter’s most basic rule. Critiquing U.S. media blind spots or advocating diplomacy doesn’t dilute that reality. It strengthens our credibility when we demand universal human rights, including ending U.S. complicity in other violations—most urgently in Gaza and Lebanon. A Green, pro-peace stance is not passive; it’s active de-escalation, material aid, refugee protection, and ceasefire-first politics rooted in law and empathy.
When people hear “diplomacy,” they sometimes hear “surrender.” That’s another narrative trick. Serious strategists have laid out ways to sustain Ukraine’s defense while carving space for negotiations that minimize civilian suffering and reduce nuclear risk. [12][13][14][15] Dismissing those options because they sound less cinematic isn’t moral clarity; it’s policy malpractice.
The Dearborn principle
Dearborn’s superpower is solidarity without silos. We can stand with Ukrainians against invasion and with Palestinians against occupation; we can oppose authoritarian disinformation abroad and demand corporate media reform at home. That’s not contradiction. That’s the consistent ethic the Green Party has long tried to articulate: grassroots democracy, nonviolence, social justice, ecological wisdom.
To get there, we need a press that lives up to the 1945 admonition that truth emerges from a “multitude of tongues.” [9] We need platforms that reward verification over virality. We need schools and civic spaces that cultivate the nerve to say, “I might be wrong—show me.” And we need local media—yes, including Dearborn Blog—to keep building wider tables where opposing narratives meet documented facts and no child’s life is a bargaining chip for someone else’s sound bite.
If the mirror keeps tricking us, widen the room.
“Offering weak versions of an opponent’s arguments and then providing evidence to discredit them… represents a real-world application of attitude inoculation.” [1][8]
Sources
[1] Beattie, P., & Sherstoboeva, E. (2025). Understanding the war in Ukraine: Comparing knowledge and bias in Russia and the U.S. Political Psychology, 46, 1168–1185. DOI: 10.1111/pops.13067. Full text and PDF available via Wiley. Wiley Online Library+1
[2] Pomerantsev, P. (2019). This Is Not Propaganda: Adventures in the War Against Reality. PublicAffairs. Publisher page. Hachette Book Group
[3] Kaye, D. (2019). Speech Police: The Global Struggle to Govern the Internet. Columbia Global Reports. Publisher overview. Columbia Global Reports+1
[4] Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism. (2022). Digital News Report 2022—Perceptions of media coverage of the war in Ukraine (Podcast overview). Reuters Institute+2Spotify+2
[5] Oleinik, A. (2023). War Propaganda Unfolded: Comparative Effectiveness of Governmental Messages in Times of War. International Journal of Communication. (140.5 million-word corpus across leaders, media, and mass discourse). International Journal of Communication
[6] Stoltenberg, J. (2023). Remarks noting Putin “went to war to prevent NATO… close to his borders” but achieved the opposite. NATO transcripts. NATO
[7] Meduza (2022–2023). On Russian public emotions and pro-war attitudes under stress and humiliation; interviews with pro-war Russians. Meduza+1
[8] Pfau, M., & colleagues (1988–1992). Foundational work on attitude inoculation in political communication; see Communication Quarterly article. Communication Cache+1
[9] United States v. Associated Press (1945). Majority reasoning on “multitude of tongues” and the First Amendment. Supreme Court/Justia summaries. Legal Information Institute+1
[10] Edele, M. (2019). “The Soviet Culture of Victory,” Journal of Contemporary History; related works on Soviet patriotic memory. JSTOR+1
[11] Edele, M. (2021–2023). Works on Soviet WWII and contemporary Russian memory politics; book talk and author site. American University+1
[12] Charap, S., et al. (2023). Avoiding a Long War in Ukraine. RAND Corporation Perspective. RAND Corporation
[13] Fix, L., & Kimmage, M. (2023–2025). A Containment Strategy for Ukraine (Nov. 2023) and What If America Abandons Ukraine? (May 2025). Foreign Affairs. Foreign Affairs+1
[14] Zakaria, F. (2023). The strategy that can support Ukraine even if Trump is elected. (Nov. 17, 2023). Column archive. Fareed Zakaria
[15] CNN Transcript: Fareed Zakaria GPS (Dec. 17, 2023) on the consequences if U.S. support wavers. CNN Transcripts
[16] Pew Research Center (Nov. 25, 2024). Partisan divisions on Ukraine support remain wide. Pew Research Center
[17] Pew Research Center (Apr. 17, 2025). Republican opinion shifts on Russia–Ukraine war. Pew Research Center
Notes on method and limitations
The main study discussed is peer-reviewed and was fielded in mid-2022; some political dynamics (e.g., U.S. partisan shifts) evolved after data collection. The authors acknowledge interpretation challenges (wording nuances, social desirability bias in Russia) and caution that measured knowledge is a proxy for broader narrative comprehension. [1]
Dearborn, the Greens, and the road ahead
Dearborn’s political soul has always been global and local: immigrant kitchens, union halls, faith institutions, and classrooms that understand that what happens on the Dnipro and what happens on the Detroit River are not separate stories. A Green Party approach asks us to insist on truth-seeking media, nonviolent policy, and equal dignity across borders. It asks us to oppose disinformation and the conditions—war, occupation, siege—that disinformation serves.
Concretely:
- Press for ceasefire pathways that reduce civilian harm while defending Ukraine’s right to self-determination.
- Demand U.S. policy coherence: end complicity in mass atrocities anywhere, including the ongoing devastation in Gaza and Lebanon.
- Build information commons in Dearborn—forums where Ukrainian, Palestinian, Yemeni, Iraqi, Syrian, Lebanese, and American veterans can map facts together, not just trade narratives.
The mirror will always be there. Our work is to step past it—into the room, into the complexity, into the human future we share.
Disclaimer: Dearborn Blog provides analysis and commentary intended for educational and informational purposes. We strive for accuracy using reputable sources, but information can change over time. The views expressed here reflect a commitment to human rights, international law, and nonviolence, and are not legal advice. Readers should consult original documents and multiple sources before drawing conclusions or taking action. Dearborn Blog disclaims liability for any errors or omissions and for outcomes based on this content.
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