The United States of America was not Israel’s first ally from the moment of its establishment in 1948 — that role only began in 1967.

On May 14, 1948, while then–U.S. President Harry Truman listened to debates in the White House about recognizing Israel, the State Department was unenthusiastic. They argued that recognizing Israel would anger Arabs and Muslims, and that Israel was not an American problem but a British one. Britain, after all, was the primary backer of the Zionist movement: it had issued the Balfour Declaration in 1917, transported Jews by ship to the shores of Palestine, provided Zionist factions and militias with weapons, protection, and training, and continuously undermined Arab military capabilities.

Without Britain, there would have been no Israel.

In the White House, President Truman was unconvinced by the State Department’s “British problem” argument. Instead, he was persuaded by the U.S. Department of Defense (the Pentagon), which argued that Israel could serve as an advanced and important base for protecting American interests in the Middle East. He was further influenced by his adviser, Clark Clifford, who reminded him of the importance of the Jewish vote and political donations. Truman recognized Israel on the very day of its establishment, though he did not provide it with large or ongoing aid at that time.

By 1956, Israel discovered that it had erred in relying on two fading empires — France and Britain. That year, France, Britain, and Israel launched the tripartite aggression (Suez Crisis) against Egypt. However, the United States sided with the Soviet Union at the United Nations to force Israel and its allies to withdraw.

This effectively removed France and Britain from their positions as great powers, in favor of the United States. Israel, realizing this, began working to transfer the “British problem” into an “American problem.”

In 1958, the Arab unity movement between Egypt and Syria, along with political tensions in Lebanon between factions favoring unity and those opposing it, drew regional attention. The pro-unity faction leaned toward the Eastern Bloc and the Soviet Union — America’s main Cold War adversary. The United States sent troops to Lebanon but with no intent to remain, as it was already heavily engaged in the Vietnam War.

Who presented themselves as the main regional strike force in the Middle East? Israel, of course — and by 1958, U.S. military and security aid to Israel began.

Domestically, Israel became increasingly important. In 1960, President John F. Kennedy began his term by meeting with Israel’s first Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, and thanking him for the Jewish vote, which had been crucial to his election victory.

By the start of the 1967 War (the Naksa), tensions in the Middle East were escalating between Arab states and Israel. A major turning point occurred when France — Israel’s main arms supplier — imposed an arms embargo on the entire Middle East, refusing to deliver 50 fighter jets to Israel in an attempt to improve relations with Arab countries after its defeat in Algeria.

In the U.S., President Lyndon Johnson was initially reluctant to provide Israel with large quantities of weapons, viewing the Middle East as less important than East Asia and the Vietnam War. But this hesitation shifted after Israel’s decisive victory in the 1967 war, in which it occupied East Jerusalem, the West Bank, Gaza, the Golan Heights, Sinai, and parts of Lebanon. This victory demonstrated Israel’s military superiority, convincing Johnson — as it had Truman in 1948 and Eisenhower in 1958 — that Israel was a strong, low-cost ally compared to European and East Asian partners, and vital for securing American interests in the oil-rich and strategically located Middle East.

The 1967 War also gave new reasons for open U.S. support, including rallying right-wing Christian voters to Israel on religious grounds. After Israel’s occupation of East Jerusalem, prophecies about the end of times and the return of Christ became prominent among conservative Protestants and evangelicals. This voting bloc, while smaller in numbers, was strategically important, especially as American Jews were concentrated in key electoral states like Florida. Johnson thus committed the U.S. to preserving Israel’s qualitative military edge and initiated decades of military, political, social, financial, and intelligence support. He was the first U.S. president to provide Israel with offensive weapons systems and was less strict about U.S. inspections of Israel’s nuclear program.

Over time, U.S. support expanded: during the 1973 October War, America provided an airlift of modern weapons; under President Ronald Reagan, Israel enjoyed major diplomatic cover for its 1981 bombing of Iraq’s nuclear reactor (“Operation Opera”) and its 1982 invasion of Lebanon; in 1985, Israel began receiving a fixed annual grant of $3 billion.

Today, U.S. military aid to Israel makes up 55% of all American military assistance worldwide. The U.S. ensures Israel’s military superiority over all Middle Eastern states — for example, providing F-35 fighter jets exclusively to Israel unless Israel waives its veto. America also stores large stockpiles of weapons in Israel, some of which are available for Israeli use. Without U.S. technology and intelligence cooperation, Israel’s capabilities would be vastly diminished. Diplomatically, the U.S. has cast nearly 46 vetoes in the UN Security Council in Israel’s favor.

Thus, the U.S. took over Britain’s dual — and contradictory — role: being both Israel’s main backer and the supposed mediator between Jewish settlers and Arabs/Palestinians. The U.S. promotes “peace” in a way that frames it as mediating between an aggressor (Israel) and the victim (the Arab and Palestinian side).

Main Reasons for U.S. Support for Israel:

Global Power Projection – Unlike declining powers like France and Britain, the U.S. seeks to maintain worldwide influence, and Israel is useful for achieving this in the Middle East.

Israeli Military Strength – In a region rich in oil, gas, and key maritime routes, Israel’s ability to assert dominance enhances American strategic influence.

Domestic Political Support – Especially from Jewish Americans and evangelical Christians, who form an influential voting bloc.

But what if these reasons fade — will Israel lose U.S. support?

1. Declining Pro-Israel Voting Power

The proportion of Jewish Americans in the population is shrinking.

Influence is shifting toward demographic groups less attached to Israel, such as Latinos and younger Americans.

A 2022 Pew Research poll showed 69% of Americans over 65 view Israel favorably, but only 41% of those aged 18–28 do.

Arab-American communities, numbering about 3 million, are growing in electoral importance, especially in Michigan (around 277,000 Arab Americans live there). In 2020, Biden won Michigan by only 155,000 votes. Arab-American voters also played a decisive role in Georgia and Pennsylvania. Over time, calls to “protect Israel” may lose electoral urgency.

No U.S. president has done more for Israel than Donald Trump — recognizing Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, brokering normalization deals, withdrawing from the Iran nuclear deal in 2018, and, in 2025, reportedly striking Iran’s nuclear facility for Israel’s sake.

2. Israel’s Eroded Image as an Invincible Power

In 1948 and 1967, Israel portrayed itself as a lone victor.

After the October 7, 2023 “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation by Hamas and other Palestinian factions, this image was shattered.

Israel’s heavy reliance on immediate U.S. military support undermines its claim to self-sufficiency.

The Arab world is no longer uniformly hostile to the U.S. as it was during the era of Arab nationalism. Some Arab states are even allies. The Soviet Union is gone, reducing Israel’s strategic value as a Cold War asset.

3. Shifting U.S. Global Priorities

The world order built after WWII, the Cold War, and the Soviet collapse in 1991 is giving way to a multipolar reality.

The U.S. is gradually reducing its presence in certain regions, and the Middle East is less important than the South China Sea and East Asia — a point made by American officials since 1999.

Every U.S. president since 1973 has tried to integrate Israel into the Arab and Islamic regional framework to reduce America’s burden.

The U.S. has, at times, pressured Israel: President Jimmy Carter pushed Israel to withdraw from Sinai for peace with Egypt; President Barack Obama signed the Iran nuclear deal in 2015 over Israeli objections and abstained from vetoing a UN resolution condemning settlements.

As happened with France and Britain, U.S. disengagement could occur if Israel becomes more of a liability than an asset.

Shifts in the U.S.–Israel Equation: Is Support Declining?

Changing U.S. Public Sentiment

Declining support among young Americans.

Rising influence of Arab and Muslim communities in key swing states like Michigan.

Pew 2022: 69% support among seniors vs. 41% among youth.

Israel’s Weakened Image of Invincibility

The October 7, 2023 “Al-Aqsa Flood” attack exposed security vulnerabilities.

Greater dependence on U.S. emergency aid.

Changing U.S. Strategic Priorities

Greater focus on the South China Sea and East Asia.

Long-term U.S. policy goal to integrate Israel regionally to reduce its cost to America.

Examples of U.S. defiance of Israeli wishes (Obama’s Iran deal, UN settlement resolution abstention).

Israel has, in many ways, shifted from being a clear asset to being a relative burden on the United States, especially as global priorities change and new powers emerge. As the strategic and domestic political drivers of U.S. support weaken, the likelihood of reassessing the relationship increases.

However, the relationship remains rooted in interests, not principles — and interests can change over time.

Mohammed Al-Mashhadani

Note: All facts in this article are sourced from public records, verified news outlets, and publicly accessible social media posts. This article is intended for public awareness and journalistic inquiry, not legal accusation. For questions or corrections, please contact info@dearbornblog.com.